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Deciding on Appropriate Use of Force: Human-





This article considers the role of norms in the debate on autonomous weapons systems (AWS). It argues that the academic
and political discussion is largely dominated by considerations of how AWS relate to norms institutionalised in international
law. While this debate on AWS has produced insights on legal and ethical norms and sounded options of a possible regula-
tion or ban, it neglects to investigate how complex human-machine interactions in weapons systems can set standards of
appropriate use of force, which are politically normatively relevant but take place outside of formal, deliberative law-setting.
While such procedural norms are already emerging in the practice of contemporary warfare, the increasing technological com-
plexity of AI-driven weapons will add to their political-normative relevance. I argue that public deliberation about and political
oversight and accountability of the use of force is at risk of being consumed and normalised by functional procedures and
perceptions. This can have a profound impact on future of remote-warfare and security policy.
1. Autonomous weapons systems and the
question of norms
The policy of extensive deployment of armed drones in the
last 15 years, representing an era of remote-warfare featur-
ing long-standing interventions involving only limited
ground troop deployment, approaches the next stage: the
development of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) and
the political debate on their possible regulation and prohibi-
tion has raised attention in recent years in the academic
and political community and even in the wider public. While
state parties to the UN’s Convention on Certain Conven-
tional Weapons (UN-CCW) in Geneva discuss the case of
AWS since 2014, their broader political implications are still
understudied.
The political and academic debates on AWS focus pre-
dominantly on how AWS challenge international law (Asaro,
2012; Grut, 2013; Kastan, 2013; Noone and Noone, 2015;
Sehrawat, 2017) as well as ethics (Heyns, 2016; Johnson and
Axinn, 2013; Leveringhaus, 2016; Sharkey, 2008). While both
dimensions are interrelated and arguments for why AWS are
legally problematic in terms of International Humanitarian
Law (IHL) are also motivated by ethical concerns, such as
human dignity and the question of whether machines
should ultimately have the decision-making power to end
human life, the current debate clearly takes place in the
margins of international law. Certainly, cases such as the
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons, the Mine Ban Treaty (Ottawa Convention),
or the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons underline the
importance of legal norms for deﬁning when and how it is
appropriate to use force. They also prove the ability of the
international community to have a signiﬁcant impact on the
trajectory of how force is used.
However, the international community has made slow
progress in their consideration of what AWS are and do.
This is widely criticised not only by NGOs, for example by
the ‘Campaign to Stop Killer Robots’, but also by countries
calling for a prohibition of AWS such as 28 UN-CCW state
parties (Campaign To Stop Killer Robots, 2018). A main prob-
lem of the UN-CCW process is its inability to ﬁnd a shared
deﬁnition of autonomy as the crucial, qualifying feature of
AWS in relation to human agency. Likewise, conceptualising
‘meaningful human control’ (MHC) (Crootof, 2016; Moyes,
2016; Roff and Moyes, 2016) – a term that gains currency at
the moment – proves to be very difﬁcult, not least because
control and autonomy are interrelated and are multi-dimen-
sional issues. The discussion is hence dominated by
attempts to ﬁnd a common ground for formulating and
institutionalising norms governing the use of force by pro-
viding guidelines of when and how the use of force is
appropriate, if speciﬁc weapons technologies are used. In
contrast to the contestation of drone-warfare (Kaag and
Kreps, 2014), technical aspects are therefore now in the cen-
tre of interest.
But the focus on the seeming uniqueness of a new gener-
ation of autonomous weapons and the resulting problem of
human control overshadows the importance of (existing)
practices of human-machine interaction in the use of force.
The importance for the US military, for instance, of devel-
oping and testing artiﬁcial intelligence (AI) solutions funded
by multi-billions of US$ in the ‘AI Next Campaign’ (see





DARPA, 2018) underlines the complexity of the issue at
stake, which is not only about ‘autonomy in the critical func-
tions of weapons systems’ (ICRC, 2016) but also about an
extensive arrangement of actors and technologies inﬂuenc-
ing the use of force. For this reason, the narrow focus on
AWS can be problematic: while the loss of MHC is arguably
accelerating with the increasing role of AI-driven technolo-
gies, ensuring an acceptable extent of MHC is always
important but often problematic in the practice of using
force.
Complex human-technology interaction is a signiﬁcant
feature of ﬁghter jets, drones, or cruise missiles, in which
humans often fail to exert meaningful control because they
rely on system information and lack an external basis to
doubt the electronic representation of reality. Nevertheless,
this compromised human control is hardly contested. If we
understand norms as ‘standards of appropriateness’ (see
Bode and Huelss, 2018), practices comprising the procedural
interplay of different technologies, elements of weapons sys-
tems, and human actors can create norms that establish a
standard of appropriate human control and hence accept-
able use of force. These norms are procedural norms
because they are the product of technical-functional pro-
cesses in contrast to political deliberation.
While this article does not deliver an extensive review of
the debate on law and ethics of AWS, it aims at discussing
the role of norms outside of these deliberative settings. The
article also contributes to emphasising the political relevance
of AWS by outlining their implications for how force is used,
which can have a structural impact on the development
and conduct of security policy and warfare in the future.
The article is organised as follows: ﬁrst, it introduces the
research dimension of norms and AWS, outlining the short-
comings of the main research focus. Second, it discusses the
implications of autonomous features for the emergence of
norms. Third, in concluding, the article outlines the political
implications of the described technological development.
2. Conceptualising norms and the impact of AI
While the political community largely operates within the
margins of international law-making, International Relations
(IR) scholarship has diversiﬁed the perspective on what
norms are and why they matter. For example, initial con-
structivist research stressed the simultaneously regulative
and constitutive qualities of norms, which do not only pro-
hibit but also shape opinions and identity (Checkel, 1998;
Klotz, 1999; Kratochwil, 1989). Without providing a more
detailed review of norms research in IR given the limitations
of this article, it is important to note for the following dis-
cussion that there are different types of norms: I suggest dif-
ferentiating between legal, ethical, and procedural norms.
Considering the broad deﬁnition of norms as standards of
appropriateness, it is apparent that appropriateness can
have very different meanings to different actors in different
contexts. Legal appropriateness codiﬁed in legal norms pur-
ports a formalised and (supposedly) ﬁxed deﬁnition of what
is prohibited. But international law actually leaves ample
room for interpretation and political decisions (see Kosken-
niemi, 2011). Law only offers a narrow understanding of
what is permissible, instead of giving precise guidance on
what is ‘right’ or legitimate in a moral sense. In contrast,
ethical appropriateness is about providing ethical norms
that can inform what is the morally ‘right’ thing to do. Ethi-
cal norms can overlap with legal norms such as basic
human rights, but their formalisation and codiﬁcation are
less extensive.
In this regard, norms can be further differentiated by their
function: legal norms (prohibiting) and ethical norms (pre-
scribing) are conceptualised as shaping what is normal (the
normality). They inﬂuence behaviour and are regulative but
also constitutive for how social relations work. Procedural
norms, in contrast, emerge in the normality of practices out
of speciﬁc understandings of what is appropriate. This
appropriateness might be in line with standards of what is
prohibited or prescribed, but the role and impact of proce-
dural norms is foremost functional. In this sense, we can fur-
ther differentiate between a prohibiting and prescribing
normativity, based on two different foundations for deﬁning
what is the (legal and ethical) right thing to do, and what is
normal/normality. What is a normal action is deﬁned by the
average behaviour in the statistical sense, representative of
how the majority of people act. This normality is also consti-
tutive by setting a framework of appropriate action with-
out resorting to legal or ethical norms.
The underlying theoretical assumption of procedural
norms is that once certain practices as way of doing things
are established, they manifest in an understanding of what
is procedurally appropriate. In other words, in any organisa-
tional context such as the military or in bureaucracies, pro-
cedures and ways of operating exist that are established
and correspond to certain aims and objectives. These proce-
dures can be formalised in manuals and trainings, but more
often they are established in diversion from or in the
absence of concrete, pre-deﬁned guidelines. Importantly,
ways of how technologies are used shapes procedures and
thereby contribute to deﬁning how to proceed appropri-
ately.
Conceptually, legal and ethical types of norms are
thought to emerge in structured, deliberative, reﬂective and
even formalised processes, in communication and negotia-
tion with others. Taken together, these norms can establish
a speciﬁc norm-based order. Examples are the regulation
and normative rejection of chemical and nuclear weapons
in terms of a ‘weapons taboo’ (Price, 1995; Tannenwald,
1999). These norms shape what is normal (use of force) in
international relations.
But the effects that perceived standards of appropriate-
ness in a procedural-functional sense can have for what
passes for normal use of force and how such understand-
ings can eventually also shape even legal and ethical norms
requires further scrutiny. Do functional necessities and pro-
cedural structures largely replace political deliberation? In
theoretical terms, we would expect that a pre-deﬁned, politi-
cally deliberated norm is implemented in actions like the
violent use of force. In this sense, normativity would guide
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the ways in which actors try to shape what is ‘normal’ in
international relations, security policy, or warfare. Reversing
this perspective, understandings of what is normal in inter-
national relations or warfare could also inform and inﬂuence
the normative dimension when practices informed by func-
tional-procedural considerations become widespread. The
availability of technology inﬂuences this – not in the sense
of technological determination but rather by creating condi-
tions of possibility for certain actions and practices.
Moreover, the increasing role of AI-driven solutions such
as machine-learning challenges human control and the abil-
ity to ‘doubt’ (Amoore, 2018) in the context of human-ma-
chine interactions. In other words, reality is always
represented or reconstructed in human-machine interfaces –
more often in terms of a transformation than as a linear,
direct translation. This refers again to the fundamental prob-
lem of MHC and how it could be realised in practice. In
terms of current and future developments, the explicability
of algorithms is a major concern, referring to the problem
that it is no longer possible for humans to retrace and
understand how an algorithm has ‘decided’, ultimately mak-
ing it a ‘black box’ (see Zarsky, 2016). The aforementioned
AI Next campaign of the US military, for example, ‘aims to
enable AI systems to explain their actions, and to acquire
and reason with common sense knowledge’ (DARPA, 2018).
While explicability is one of the central problems of ‘auton-
omy’, my argument in this article is broader, emphasising
the way technology inﬂuences human decisions. This is
important in the context of my conceptualisation of proce-
dural norms because the weakening of human control will
also mean that norms are increasingly less the outcome of
human deliberation. Furthermore, it is important to highlight
how human decisions are compromised, underlining that
the degree of autonomy is less important than the question
how human-machine interactions take place.
3. Transmitting reality: functional appropriateness
and procedural norms
Research on remote-warfare is dominated by the growing
importance of armed drones, particularly in the US-led ‘war
on terror’. While questions of international law are also pre-
dominant in this research ﬁeld, theoretically motivated stud-
ies have also investigated the effect of drone warfare on
concepts of the use of force (Kaag and Kreps, 2014; Sauer
and Sch€ornig, 2012; Warren and Bode, 2015) and assessed
technological features as well as political and sociological
effects (Schwarz, 2016; Walters, 2014). However, drones are
only part of a broader security network, comprising highly
interrelated actors and technologies. This is important
because it shows to what extent extensive human-machine
interactions are contributing to drone-strikes as the end-
point of using force. In the context of AWS and increasing
autonomy, this raises the question of how human control
relates to multi-dimensional practices but also how norms
of procedural appropriateness emerge here that deﬁne what
appropriate human control is, for instance. Research on the
‘targeting cycle’ of ﬁghter jets, for example, suggests that
human control is deeply compromised and distributed in
contemporary weapons systems (Ekelhof, 2018). The ‘human
in the loop’ holding total control over machines is therefore
arguably ‘an impossible ﬁgure’ (Amoore, 2018, p. 9).
With regard to the broad arrangement of using force, I
emphasise the importance of data collection and target
identiﬁcation, which is at present already strongly shaped
by the use of AI-driven features such as machine-learning.
Examples are the US activities in installing an extensive
surveillance regime, partly using drones, partly satellites and
other relevant technologies. Revelations in recent years, for
example on the National Security Agency (NSA) PRISM pro-
gramme, point to the excessive information gathering of US
intelligence services on millions of users worldwide (Sottek,
2013). In the military context, the collected ‘metadata’ is a
key element of surveillance and target identiﬁcation, used
inter alia in ‘signature strikes’, that is, strikes that target peo-
ple based on patterned of supposedly ‘suspicious’ behaviour
rather than identiﬁed individuals. Former Assistant Secretary
for Homeland Security Policy Stewart Baker emphasised that
‘metadata absolutely tells you everything about somebody’s
life. If you have enough metadata, you do not really need
content’, while General Michael Hayden, former director of
the NSA and the CIA underline that ‘[w]e kill people based
on metadata’ (Cole, 2014).
A concrete example is the US surveillance programme
SKYNET that shows how target identiﬁcation is delegated
to machine-learning solutions able to process a vast
amount of data and identifying unusual patterns, in this
case of 55 million mobile phone users in Pakistan (The
Intercept, 2015). The aim of this programme segment was
to develop an understanding of what constitutes ‘normal’
behaviour and is based on machine-learning solutions. In
this case, normality is deﬁned by the behaviour of most
people – or rather of data points showing speciﬁc move-
ment patterns. SKYNET contributed to large-scale surveil-
lance operations executed by drones and was meant to
inform the US targeted-killing practice. In a widely reported
case, SKYNET identiﬁed the Al Jazeera journalist Ahmad Zai-
dan as a possible member of al-Qaeda and the Muslim
Brotherhood, based on his travel patterns and mobile
phone call logs, which were, however, linked to his inves-
tigative work in Pakistan (Parvaz, 2017). The decisive point
is that machine-learning solutions develop an ad hoc
understanding of anomalies (see Aradau and Blanke, 2018),
which can have so far neglected political and normative
implications. What counts as a legitimate target is not pre-
deﬁned but delegated to an algorithm that scans for
‘anomalous’ human behaviour.
‘The politics of the list’ (de Goede et al., 2016), whether
this refers to ‘kill-lists’ or targeted sanctions based on
surveillance metadata, points to the importance of how pro-
cessing information is part of coercion and the use of force.
With regard to the topic of this article, the decisive question
is to what extent political deliberation is increasingly inﬂu-
enced or even replaced by technical procedures comprising
the development of technical benchmarks to ultimately
decide about life and death.
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This is not a completely novel problem: a ‘friendly ﬁre’
incident during the Iraq war in 2003, involving a US Patriot
missile defence battery and a British Tornado ﬁghter jet,
showed that MHC was dependent on the accuracy of elec-
tronically processed information. The ofﬁcial inquiry noted
that ‘Patriot crews are trained to react quickly, engage early
and to trust the Patriot system (. . .) The crew had about
one minute to decide whether to engage. The crew was
fully trained, but their training had focused on recognising
generic threats rather than on those that were speciﬁc to
Iraq or on identifying false alarms’ (Ministry of Defence,
2004, p. 3). However, this incident did not lead to abandon-
ing Patriot systems nor to a general contestation of techno-
logical autonomy. Moreover, the Patriot crew was cleared of
any wrongdoing because they followed procedures. This
means that a certain procedural norm of what is accept-
able/appropriate human control has emerged, although
lethal incidents could not be ruled out completely.
The important point is that procedural standards of
appropriate action – deﬁning the normality of warfare – can
diffuse into the dimension of legality and normativity. When
calculations of statistical anomaly (like in the case of SKY-
NET) turn into deﬁnitions of normal and abnormal human
behaviour, a ﬂexible benchmark rather than a ﬁxed political
norm deﬁnes what the appropriate use of force is in prac-
tice. Human control presupposing a deﬁnition of appropriate
action – for example identifying a potential target and how
to engage this target – is increasingly under pressure when
algorithmic parameters for selecting the ‘best’ target are
unclear or speed and quantity of data surpasses the cogni-
tive abilities of humans. The further advancement of autono-
mous features in weapons systems implies the risk that
norms governing the use of force are not only executed but
increasingly created by machines. The inﬂuence of the
human actor responsible for implementing decisions taken
at a different level slowly recedes in the use of force
sequence. The inability and partly unwillingness of the polit-
ical debate to deﬁne key aspects such as autonomy in
weapons systems or MHC in the framework of the UN-CCW
– besides the multi-dimensional character of ‘using force’ –
makes the adoption of a comprehensive regulation or ban
of AI-driven and informed security policy difﬁcult. This
underlines the utmost importance of focusing on the norm-
setting effects of practices comprising human-machine inter-
actions. The outlined procedural norms are powerful com-
pared to vague, abstract and distant legal and ethical norms
because they are the most important practical measure to
ensure ‘appropriate’ actions.
4. Conclusion: AI in weapons technology and the
use of force
The implications of the growing signiﬁcance of AI-driven
features in weapons system and in processes of using force
are important but understudied. This paper focused on how
human-machine interactions inﬂuence and limit human con-
trol, leading to functionally deﬁned norms of what appropri-
ate use of force is. Practices of using force are increasingly
inﬂuenced by technologically operated processes that com-
promise meaningful human control. These processes are cre-
ating a normality of what it means to use force in speciﬁc
contexts. While the direct interaction of humans and weap-
ons systems already creates understandings of what accept-
able human control is – for example in the case of Patriot
systems or armed drones – the use of force is a broader
process and the analysis should therefore consider different
dimensions that are relevant for human control. Particularly,
current practices of surveillance and data collection such as
PRISM or SKYNET show to what extent AI-driven applications
already interfere in decisions of what constitutes abnormal
behaviour or a legitimate target.
If we consider meaningful human control as a norm to be
deﬁned on the level of political deliberation and meant to
satisfy requirements of accountability and responsibility, the
question arises to what extent this norm will by shaped by
the normality of what meaningful human control means in
the practice of using force. The normality of the use of force
is and will be deﬁned in the military context and technolo-
gies inﬂuence this deﬁnition to a large extent. This suggests
that the political deﬁnition of the desirable normal risks
being replaced by procedures, benchmarks, and machinic
agency. The existing lack of knowledge and awareness con-
tests the political control of weaponised AI, leaving it to
technical procedures to provide the required levels of
accountability and responsibility.
Being aware of the outlined implications of AI in security
and defence systems is a ﬁrst step towards a possible politi-
cal response to these issues. The more control shifts from
humans to machines in terms of algorithms or machine-
learning, the less the deﬁnition of what use of force ought
to be in practices is still subject to legal-political account-
ability and authority. In this regard, the perspective on
norms presented in this article shows why the growing rele-
vance of AI in weapons systems should be of great concern.
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